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Promoting versatile vaccine development for emerging
pandemics
Joshua T. Monrad 1,2,3✉, Jonas B. Sandbrink 3,4 and Neil G. Cherian5,6
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the importance of rapid and versatile development of emergency medical
countermeasures such as vaccines. We discuss the role of platform vaccines and prototype pathogen research in modern vaccine
development, and outline how previous pathogen-specific funding approaches can be improved to adequately promote vaccine
R&D for emerging pandemics. We present a more comprehensive approach to financing vaccine R&D, which maximises biomedical
pandemic preparedness by promoting flexible vaccine platforms and translatable research into prototype pathogens. As the
numerous platform-based SARS-CoV-2 vaccines show, funders can accelerate pandemic vaccine development by proactively
investing in versatile platform technologies. For certain emerging infectious diseases, where vaccine research can translate to other
related pathogens with pandemic potential, investment decisions should reflect the full social value of increasing overall
preparedness, rather than just the value of bringing a vaccine to market for individual pathogens.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to proactively
and rapidly develop medical countermeasures against novel
pandemic pathogens. As an emerging pathogen, the work to
develop and trial SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidates only began after
the novel strain was sampled and the genome was sequenced in
early January. By the time the World Health Organisation declared
a global pandemic in March, many projections suggested that
regulatory authorisation and distribution of a vaccine could take
up to several years. Less than 12 months later, the first patients
have been vaccinated with safe and effective vaccines outside of
clinical trials, and immunisation efforts are due to commence
globally. The fact that the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development and
authorisation process has been the swiftest in history owes to
several factors, including a concerted research effort, unprece-
dented public and private investments, and overwhelmingly high
global incidence. But another key factor that enabled vaccine
developers to progress so rapidly has been a set of specific
vaccinological insights and technologies developed before the
novel coronavirus was even identified. In this article, we examine
how to promote modern approaches to shortening the timelines
between novel pathogen identification, successful vaccine licen-
sing, and population-level coverage. Because biotechnological
knowledge obtained from certain work on existing pathogens can
be applied for research on future countermeasures against novel
pandemic diseases, a pathogen-specific approach to financing
research and development (R&D) fails to create the adequate
incentives to invest in flexible approaches that maximise
pandemic preparedness. We present a more comprehensive
approach to biomedical innovation policy that emphasises
vaccine platform development and translatable research on
prototype pathogens and join others in calling for increased
investment in promising technologies against the next pan-
demic1–3.
Two distinct but complementary approaches stand out as
promising pathways to accelerating the development of future
pandemic vaccines: the advancement of vaccine platforms and
research on prototype pathogens4,5. While the term “platform
technologies” for biomedical innovation is used in a wide range of
contexts6, we adopt a working definition stating that a vaccine
candidate is platform-based if “an underlying, nearly identical
mechanism, device, delivery vector, or cell line [is] employed for
multiple target vaccines”7. This definition encompasses a range of
product types, including vaccines based on viral vectors,
recombinant protein expression systems, or nucleic acids, and
distinguishes novel platform vaccines from pathogen-specific
approaches, such as whole-inactivated or live-attenuated viruses,
that are the basis of most currently licensed vaccines.
The other approach for shortening development timelines of
future pandemic vaccines is to research certain ‘prototype
pathogens’ that may inform future vaccine design for similar
pathogens4,5,8,9. Under the prototype pathogen approach, ‘inves-
tigators would conduct countermeasure research for prototype
pathogens, understanding that the prototype may not emerge as
a threat but assuming that techniques would be applicable to
closely related microorganisms’3–5,8. Such research can target
prototypic members of viral families, genera or species known to
pose risks to humans, prioritised according to their expected
structural similarity to the next potential pandemic pathogen. It
may, for example, involve identifying conserved antigen epitopes,
so that insights into vaccine design may be readily translated to
tackling novel pathogens. This work may also inform the
development of multivalent or universal vaccines efficacious
against related viruses through targeting a conserved antigen.
Here, we focus especially on viral pathogens due to their potential
for causing global catastrophic pandemics and in this paper, we
primarily use the terms ‘prototype pathogen’ and ‘emerging
pathogens’ in reference to viruses3,5. However, the importance of
emerging bacterial, parasitic, and fungal pathogens should not be
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understated—particularly in light of increasing antimicrobial
resistance—and the general approach that we present here can
potentially be applied to non-viral emerging pathogens.
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE FOR VACCINE R&D
Failures in the market for infectious disease vaccines
While for-profit pharmaceutical companies relying on commercial
investments conduct a large share of pharmaceutical R&D—
especially late-stage clinical trials—a range of well-understood
economic factors cause private investment in infectious disease
vaccines to often fall far short of what would be the socially
optimal level, compared to other biomedical products. Economic
theory and evidence suggest that preventive products tend to be
less lucrative than curative therapeutics, even for products with
the same potential to generate social value10, and the powerful
positive externalities that vaccines create by preventing commu-
nity transmission mean that the demand for vaccines is often
lower than the socially optimal level11. Consequently, with the
exception of a few blockbuster products—such as Pfizer’s
multivalent pneumococcal vaccine and Merck’s nonavalent
human papillomavirus vaccine, both of which have billion-dollar
markets—vaccine sales rarely constitute a large share of revenues
for leading pharmaceutical producers. This problem is exacer-
bated in the case of pathogens primarily affecting populations in
lower-income countries with less purchasing power, and in the
case of sporadic emerging epidemic pathogens, where a
sustained demand for the vaccine is not guaranteed and
investments are particularly risky from a commercial perspec-
tive12–14.
Existing approaches to creating markets for vaccines
In light of these pervasive and well-understood market failures,
several actors have financed vaccine R&D for known diseases with
epidemic potential15. These include governmental agencies, such
as the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States;
supranational bodies, such as the European Commission; and
philanthropic foundations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation and Wellcome Trust. In the wake of the 2014–2015
Ebola outbreak, the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness Innova-
tions (CEPI) was founded as a public-private partnership to
coordinate funding for vaccines against epidemic diseases. Since
then, CEPI has supported the development of numerous vaccines
for priority pathogens and worked to ensure global equitable
access to novel licensed vaccines16.
In addition to the ‘push’ funding (i.e., up-front grants for
promising projects) for preclinical and early clinical work, there is a
need for ‘pull’ mechanisms (i.e., rewards for output, such as prizes
or market guarantees) more suitable for late-stage clinical trials
and product development, as well as global mechanisms to
finance, manage, and maintain investigational product stockpiles
for preparedness. Although certain emerging pathogens like
Nipah virus and MERS-CoV may not cause outbreaks that are large
enough for conventional efficacy trials, such that licensure may be
considered on the basis of data from animal studies17, most
vaccine development programs will involve phase 3 trials that
require significant capital investments. One proposal to create the
adequate incentives to complete such trials is the ‘Advance
Purchase Commitment’ (APC), which works by having a funder
precommit to purchasing doses of a vaccine, conditional on it
being successfully licensed and produced11. This approach has
been successfully employed to facilitate the development of
pneumococcal vaccines18,19, and purchase agreements are also
being employed for SARS-CoV-2 candidates, including through the
COVAX initiative from Gavi, CEPI, and the WHO20.
While the APC is a promising solution for endemic diseases or
widespread active pandemics, where high demand for the vaccine
is guaranteed, its applicability for emerging epidemic diseases is
often limited by the fact that the mechanism ties developer
remuneration to the quantity of procured doses. If an epidemic
vaccine is employed early, when case number and geographical
distribution are still very limited, it may successfully contain an
outbreak before it grows too large, thereby quelling its own
market because fewer doses are required21. Consequently, the
standard APC does not strongly incentivise bringing the product
to market proactively to preempt widespread pandemics. As
Christopher Snyder and colleagues note, “When the best social
outcome determines the worst economic outcome for the
developer, there is a strong argument for a non-market
intervention”21.
To optimally incentivise commercial vaccine developers, fund-
ing mechanisms for epidemic vaccines should delink revenues
from used doses and instead create a reward that matches the
social value of developing vaccines, including both health and
economic benefits. Christopher Snyder, Kendall Hoyt, and
colleagues from CEPI recently proposed a mechanism with this
feature13. Focusing on the case of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, they
present a variation of the APC in which the maximum amount
paid for successful development is derived from the total social
value of deploying a vaccine against SARS-CoV-2, accounting for
both the value of saving lives and the economic benefits of
mitigating the pandemic. The idea of bringing private incentives
better in line with expected social value has been proposed and
applied in other contexts22, and should be integrated into
financing mechanisms for epidemic vaccine R&D beyond SARS-
CoV-213,21.
MARKET FAILURES ARISING FROM SPILLOVERS IN VACCINE
RESEARCH
Combinations of push-funding and pull-funding offer promising
solutions to financing both early and late-stage R&D for epidemic
vaccines. However, a distinct challenge arises in the context of
funding for vaccine platforms and prototype pathogen research,
as the total social value of advancing these technologies—
including translatable biotechnological insights that increase
pandemic preparedness—exceeds the direct value of having a
medical countermeasure for any one particular pathogen. In a
nutshell, the knowledge obtained from advancing vaccine
platforms and applying them to prototype pathogens creates
positive technological spillovers that render pathogen-specific
financing approaches inadequate. (While the term ‘spillover’ often
is used in reference to zoonotic spillovers, we use it here in the
manner used in the economics literature, as a reference to the
positive externalities of technological development.)
Positive technological spillovers of platform advancement
Advancing vaccine platforms generates technology that enables
rapid pandemic vaccine development. Platform vaccine
approaches, such as RNA, DNA, and virally-vectored vaccines,
can feature properties such as fast genetic sequence-based
design, testing, and rapid and scalable manufacturing. While
these new platforms do not yet have the established track-record
of classical inactivation or attenuation approaches—and in the
case of DNA vaccines, have only been licensed for veterinary use
to date despite decades of research23—a growing body of
preclinical and clinical evidence supports their significant
potential.
The viral vector approach has shown promise as the basis of two
approved Ebola vaccines—the recombinant vesicular stomatitis
virus vaccine from Merck and the human adenovirus 26 and
modified vaccinia virus Ankara vaccine from Johnson & Johnson—as
J.T. Monrad et al.
2













well as multiple vaccine candidates for SARS-CoV-2, including the
chimpanzee adenovirus vector vaccine from Oxford-AstraZeneca.
Similarly, several SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidates are based on
nucleic acid platforms, including those from NIH-Moderna and
BioNTech-Pfizer.
Because vaccines based on the same platform may only differ in
the sequence encoding the target antigen, preclinical, and early-
stage clinical work on one pathogen can inform the general
optimisation, formulation, and delivery of the platform, meaning
that platform-based vaccine candidates have the potential to
reach the clinical stage of testing faster than more traditional
vaccine candidates4,9,24. Furthermore, the first phase 3 clinical data
on the efficacy of these novel nucleic vaccine platforms does not
only indicate their suitability to tackle the pathogen in question
but also for a range of pathogens with similar correlates of
protection. Additionally, manufacturing facilities constructed for
the production of a specific nucleic acid-based vaccine may be
repurposed for related vaccines, and experience with large scale
manufacturing will directly translate to further optimisation of
speed and cost of production of future vaccines based on the
same platform. The ongoing development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines
provides evidence for the idea that investing in platforms is a way
to enable a more rapid response. The NIH-Moderna, BioNTech-
Pfizer, and Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines for which there is efficacy
data from phase 3 trials as of December 2020—a record speed by
historical standards—are all based on platform approaches.
Moreover, the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, as well as the vaccines
from Inovio and Imperial College London that are currently in
clinical trials, are based on platforms that CEPI has funded over the
past few years16,25.
While it remains to be seen whether any of the vaccines against
SARS-CoV-2 will provide long-term protection, the fact that
platform technologies are behind some of the first candidates to
prove effective against the novel coronavirus suggests that efforts
to advance these approaches over the past years have yielded
significant social value. Crucially, given the various advantages
and disadvantages of different platforms, and the potential
variation in their usefulness against pathogens with different
tissue tropism and susceptibility to humoral or cellular immune
responses, it will remain critical to advance a broad portfolio of
platforms. For instance, RNA and viral vector-based vaccines can
induce robust cellular immune responses that may be necessary
for effective immunity against enveloped viruses with complex
pathogenesis such as poxviruses or filoviruses, while virus-like
particles might be most suitable to induce neutralising antibody
responses against non-enveloped viruses5. Additionally, potential
antigen-specific concerns such as disease enhancement or
induction of autoimmunity must be addressed for each new
vaccine, largely independently from previous experience with
other vaccines based on the same platform, while concurrently
generating clinical (human) data supporting the versatility of their
underlying platforms.
Positive spillovers of prototype pathogen vaccine
development
Applying vaccine platforms to prototype pathogens within each of
the main families of viruses known to cause human infection may
be critical for enabling fast development of vaccines in the face of
an emerging pandemic5. Work on one pathogen may speed up
the development of a vaccine against a novel pathogen, as was
the case when prior work on yellow fever, Japanese encephalitis
virus, dengue, and other members of the Flaviviridae family
accelerated the emergency development of vaccine candidates
for Zika virus4,5,26.
The case of earlier research on human β-coronaviruses
informing SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development provides an instruc-
tive example of how such technological spillover effects may
manifest. While the spike protein (S) would have likely been a clear
choice of antigen based on its similarity to the cell entry
glycoproteins of other viruses, work on coronaviruses corrobo-
rated that this major surface protein is indeed a prime target for
induction of neutralising antibodies27.
Previous work on respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenza
virus, and MERS-CoV has shown that prefusion-stabilised immuno-
gens may improve neutralising antibody responses against
enveloped viruses28–30. Before the pandemic, researchers at the
U.S. NIH identified two proline (2P) substitutions at the apex of the
central helix and heptad repeat 1, which stabilise the spike protein
of MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV, and HCoV-HKU1 in its prefusion
conformation29,31. This prefusion stabilisation has been applied
to the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, and this S-2P prefusion-stabilised
spike protein is used in a range of vaccines candidates, including
those by NIH-Moderna, BioNTech-Pfizer, Novavax, and Johnson &
Johnson, which exemplifies how previous research on antigen
optimisation, including for MERS-CoV, has been important for
SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development32–35. Additionally, a similar lipid
nanoparticle formulation to that of the mRNA-1273 vaccine was
tested for a MERS-CoV S-2P mRNA vaccine in mice27, demonstrat-
ing that the S-2P encoding mRNA was able to induce protective
immunity against MERS-CoV and indicating that similar
approaches might work for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Furthermore,
the mouse model of SARS-CoV-2 used in this study, which is based
on CRISPR/Cas9-induced mutations in the dipeptidyl peptidase 4
receptor, was initially developed for MERS-CoV27,36. Indeed, the
generation of animal models is critical for enabling preclinical
product development and should be an important part of
prototype pathogen work. Early efficacy data show that the
rapidly developed SARS-CoV-2 vaccines based on the pre-fusion-
stabilised spike protein are efficacious, which suggests that
technical spillovers from preliminary MERS-CoV work have
successfully accelerated SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development.
Clinical work on a MERS-CoV vaccine has also sped up the
clinical development of a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine; safety data from a
phase 1 human trial with a virally vectored chimpanzee
adenovirus platform (ChAdOx1)-based vaccine encoding the
MERS-CoV spike glycoprotein enabled fast commencement of
large-scale clinical trials of the ChAdOx1-based AZD1222 vaccine,
which encodes the SARS-CoV-2 spike glycoprotein37,38. Similarly,
prior work on a DNA plasmid vaccine for MERS-CoV aided the
development of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine that Inovio Pharmaceu-
ticals as of December 2020 has moved into a phase 2 trial39.
Clinical efficacy trials of vaccines against prototype pathogens
may be critical for identifying the correlate of protection for
different viral families, i.e., what extent of induction of neutralising
antibody responses versus cellular immunity is needed by a
vaccine to be protective. This may help to inform platform choice,
antigen selection, and vaccine formulation and delivery when
starting vaccine development on a novel-related pathogen.
These examples of SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and HCoV-HKU1
research being translated to the context of SARS-CoV-2 highlight
how work on prototype pathogens creates positive scientific and
technological spillovers. Some of these spillovers, such as the
promising nature of the spike glycoprotein as a target antigen or
information on animal models of infection, are likely to be
published widely and can therefore benefit research efforts for
other vaccine-preventable diseases. In this case, the generated
knowledge is a clear example of a positive spillover that creates a
need for public intervention into the market for research and
development. However, this relies on the results of translatable
work on prototype pathogens—such as insights into antigen
optimisation—being accessible to public use. Therefore, public
funding of prototype pathogen work should seek to promote
research that generates openly accessible and translatable
insights as far as practicable, while also judiciously taking
advantage of generating proprietary intellectual property. Even
J.T. Monrad et al.
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in the cases where a proprietary insight might primarily benefit
the originating organisation, such as early preclinical evidence and
safety data from clinical trials, the research remains worthy of
subsidy because society benefits from having developers that are
better prepared to respond to emerging infectious diseases.
Beyond novel platforms, the prototype pathogen approach may
also be applied to live attenuated viral and inactivated virus
vaccines, where insights on antigen design, attenuation, and
optimisation, as well as purification and manufacturing process
steps, are potentially transferable to development of vaccines for
related pathogens. Therefore, even for more classical vaccines,
research, and development investments may create knowledge
spillovers that are not pathogen-specific. For instance, a novel
synonymous codon replacement attenuation approach has been
applied to both influenza A virus and RSV40.
The missed opportunity of pathogen-specific approaches to
financing
Due to the technological spillovers from platform advancement
and prototype pathogen research, pathogen-specific approaches
to funding lack incentives that maximise biomedical preparedness
for novel emerging pathogens. For preclinical and early clinical
stages, grant-based funding can offset commercial risk for vaccine
developers by covering the costs of research and development up
to a certain point. But given the high opportunity costs of
diverting resources from more lucrative domains of pharmaceu-
tical development, the prospect of merely covering costs may not
induce strong enough interest from industry41. And because even
preclinical and early-stage clinical work on vaccine platforms and
prototype pathogens can yield valuable technological know-how,
financial incentives must be structured such that companies can
expect a competitive return on investment by reaching certain
milestones along the R&D pathway, even if an investment does
not result in a product licensed by regulators.
Pull-mechanisms can solve the problem of incentivising late-
stage vaccine development for epidemic diseases, if their prize
amount is derived from the expected harm caused by known
pathogens. While uncertainty exists around whether certain
pathogens are even likely to cause widespread epidemics,
epidemiological, and economic modelling can be employed to
estimate, at least to a first approximation, the optimal risk-
adjusted rewards for successful development of vaccines against
known emerging infectious diseases. However, by focusing on the
value of addressing individual pathogens, such solutions will
undervalue the advancement of platform-based vaccines as well
as their application to certain prototype pathogens.
Consider, for example, a funder looking to support work on one
of the WHO’s priority pathogens42. If their funding decisions were
conceived exclusively to address that pathogen, they would, all else
equal, offer the very same financial incentives for pathogen-specific
approaches (such as live-attenuated or whole-inactivated vaccines),
as they would have for platform-based vaccines. Such a funding
decision would be made in spite of the fact that the latter kind of
project could create substantial positive spillovers by advancing the
underlying platform technology. While firms or other entities do of
course benefit from advancing their platform technologies, this
benefit can only be realised insofar as successful product
development for other pathogens is sufficiently commercially
lucrative in the first place; a condition that is unlikely to be met
given the numerous failures in the market for vaccines outlined
above. Consequently, as the number of potential applications of an
innovative platform increases, so does the magnitude of the gap
between private value and social value. In other words, the more
useful a platform technology for the development of vaccines
against a wide range of viruses—for instance through induction of
both neutralising antibodies as well as a robust cellular immune
response—the more complementarities there are between
research on one pathogen and research on other emerging
pathogens, and the stronger is the market failure and the
justification for intervention in the form of non-market incentives.
The case of MERS-CoV provides an illustrative example of how
the same problem exists in the case of prototype pathogens.
Suppose that a funder in 2019 had contemplated supporting the
development of a vaccine for MERS-CoV; a virus that had already
been identified as a target for prototype research on the
Coronaviridae family by researchers at the U.S. NIH5,8. If the funder
did not consider the generalisable insights that may arise from
work on MERS-CoV, they may underinvest in such research. To be
clear, the high fatality rate of MERS and the history of significant
nosocomial outbreaks certainly warranted support for vaccine
development, and the virus was rightly identified as a priority
pathogen by both the WHO and CEPI42. However, at the time,
certain epidemiological features of the virus could have appeared
to weigh against larger investments: less than three thousand
cases were reported between 2012 and 2019—the majority of
which were in just one country, Saudi Arabia—and human-to-
human transmission appeared limited to close-contact healthcare
settings43. Given these transmission characteristics, any estimates
of the value of a MERS-CoV vaccine may have had their upper
bounds defined by the apparent lack of truly pandemic potential.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, we know that prior work
on platform-based vaccines for MERS-CoV has offered highly
valuable insights for SARS-CoV-2. Thus, any financing scheme that
did not account for this complementarity would have undervalued
R&D for MERS-CoV platform vaccines.
Going forward, it will be critical to identify the prototype
pathogens for which proactive research will yield the greatest
benefits for biomedical pandemic preparedness. For example,
researchers from the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases have highlighted Nipah virus (NiV) as a
prototype pathogen for the Henipavirus genus in the Paramyx-
oviridae family, and CEPI has invested in early vaccine develop-
ment programs for NiV5. The regular emergence of NiV outbreaks,
involving some human-to-human transmission, and relatively high
mutational rate of RNA viruses raises the possibility that we will
see a future pandemic from a virus related to the current NiV that
has acquired greater transmissibility44,45. Since work on vaccines
for NiV, such as generalisable structure-based approaches to
antigen stabilisation and immunogen development, can apply to
other henipaviruses or paramyxoviruses46, it is critical that
pharmaceutical interest in such work does not hinge exclusively
on the commercial value of bringing a single henipavirus vaccine
to market.
SOLUTIONS
Creating stronger commercial incentives
To improve overall pandemic preparedness, pathogen-specific
approaches to funding R&D should be complemented by efforts
that maximise our collective ability to address novel unknown
pathogens. As the example of SARS-CoV-2 shows, especially
preclinical and early-stage clinical work can be highly valuable in
demonstrating the viability of a platform or improving antigen
selection and optimisation for prototype pathogens. The work of
CEPI provides a model approach for funding this kind of R&D,
following their long term objective “to transform a selection of the
platforms funded … into a sustainable toolbox of platform
technologies [that] could be ready for response”47. To facilitate the
advancement of multipurpose platforms, CEPI requires potential
grantees to propose plans for generating preclinical safety,
immunogenicity and efficacy data for three different pathogens
in addition to their plans for performing a Phase I clinical trial for
at least one selected antigen47. Moreover, CEPI accounts for the
complementarity between research on different pathogens by
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encouraging grantees to develop their platform vaccines against
known prototype pathogens. By considering how technological
spillovers increase the expected social value of certain research
when prioritising between projects to fund, governments and
philanthropists can spur early-stage research leading to potentially
generalisable insights and allow for a longer-term research
agenda into important areas, that may be relatively neglected
by the commercial pharmaceutical sector. Importantly, invest-
ments in prototype pathogen research and vaccine platform
advancement are also complementary, as the value of under-
standing prototype pathogens is greater if that knowledge can be
applied through flexible platforms, and vice versa.
For pull-mechanisms designed to induce successful product
development, the prize must account for the indirect benefits of
advancing platform vaccines and researching prototype patho-
gens. One promising approach would be to modify the advance
purchase agreement variation recently developed by Snyder and
colleagues13. Since, their model sets the potential prize paid to
vaccine manufacturers as a function of the expected social value
of a successfully developed vaccine (the funder’s “demand”), it
could be adapted by extending this derivation to include a term
for the indirect value of technological spillovers. This would
require quantifying the benefits of various technological and
scientific advances by considering the relative advantages of
various platforms7, the pandemic characteristics of different
pathogens3, and the concrete potential for shortening vaccine
development timelines or increasing the likelihood of success.
While obtaining an exact quantitative valuation may be complex,
it is possible to evaluate the relative merits of various scientific
advances and set financial incentives accordingly. For example,
reward amounts should be greater for the first time that any
manufacturer successfully demonstrates safety and efficacy in
phase 3 trials for any given platform or prototype pathogen, since
such data may inform further optimisation of the platform or shed
light on correlates of protection for related viruses.
In considering the relative merits of different vaccine platforms,
funders should also consider potential dual-use concerns asso-
ciated with some kinds of biomedical research. For example,
certain research on viral vectors, particularly work which involves
viral engineering to evade antivector immunity, may lead to
insights associated with dual-use risk. Such risks are a negative
externality borne by all of society rather than just the agent
undertaking the research. By explicitly incorporating this risk into
funding decisions—e.g., by announcing that larger financial
rewards are awarded to robust approaches—funders can incenti-
vise the safe and secure development of novel synthetic biological
methods. Recent work by Sebastian Farquhar and colleagues
shows how quantitative estimates of dual-use risks can be
obtained through either a market-based insurance model or a
centrally commissioned risk assessment48.
Alternative approaches to accelerating R&D
Beyond creating market-oriented financial incentives, govern-
ments and philanthropists can accelerate biomedical R&D by
supporting and coordinating precompetitive collaborations
between industry stakeholders. By pooling technical expertise
and collaborating towards shared advances for vaccine platforms
and prototype pathogens, such as improved assays, animal
models, and manufacturing processes, developers can benefit
from the downstream R&D outputs that apply to a wide range of
vaccine products, including both novel platforms and classical
vaccine approaches. This approach has been applied successfully
in the form of the Biomarkers Consortium, the Patient-Reported
Outcomes Consortium, and the Innovative Medicines Initiative,
and key proponents of the prototype pathogen approach have
called for the formation of scientific consortia for work on
universal vaccines and novel vaccine-delivery approaches5. The
World Health Organisation is well-positioned to play a normative
role in facilitating consortia efforts and knowledge sharing, as are
civil society organisations as crucial advocates for equitable
access. Moreover, public sequence repositories such as the Global
Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data, where early SARS-CoV-2
sequences were shared, can facilitate faster commencement of
global vaccine development efforts.
Given the profound benefits of developing novel vaccine
technologies, governments may also be in an ideal position to
take a more proactive approach. Publicly financed research
institutions, including universities, already contribute considerably
to vaccine development by generating non-proprietary insights
into fundamental immunology and vaccinology. By prioritising
platform vaccines and prototype pathogen research, universities
and public agencies can play a critical role in performing early
fundamental research and advancing adaptable vaccine technol-
ogies. Moreover, in addition to undertaking crucial basic scientific
research, public, and non-profit research institutions can lead the
way through all stages of vaccine development. Examples include
R&D efforts spearheaded by the U.S. government and military,
which led to the successful development of numerous vaccines in
the 20th century49. More recently, the Public Health Agency of
Canada designed the rVSV Ebola vaccine that was since licensed
to the biotechnology firm NewLink Genetics and subsequently
acquired by Merck before it was authorised for use by regulators
in the EU, North America, and Africa. Moreover, the public Instituto
Butantan in Brazil has played a central role in the late-stage
development of affordable vaccines for dengue and influenza21,50.
Similarly, public agencies have been central in the development of
various SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, including the U.S. NIH and the
Chinese Wuhan Institute of Biological Products25,51,52. In addition
to prioritising the most socially valuable R&D targets, public
involvement in vaccine development can promote equitable and
affordable vaccine access through volume and pricing commit-
ments for developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Biomedical pandemic preparedness requires prudent investments
in R&D for vaccine platforms and prototype pathogens, which
account for the knowledge gains that aid vaccine development for
multiple pathogens, including novel viruses with pandemic
potential. Governments should take an active role in leading
development efforts with positive technological spillovers,
through publicly financed research, product development partner-
ships, and facilitated precompetitive partnerships. While we have
primarily focused on viruses and novel vaccine technologies here,
this overarching argument is applicable to other emerging
pathogens, including drug-resistant bacteria, as well as more
classical vaccine approaches. Indeed, given the extensive prior
experience with established safety and lasting protection profiles
from large scale immunisation campaigns—such as for measles,
yellow fever virus, polio, and influenza—these vaccines have some
valuable advantages relative to novel platform approaches and
may be an important component in the biomedical preparedness
arsenal. Additionally, at least in the short term, manufacturing and
distribution capacity may be greater for more established vaccine
types, increasing their relative importance for the ongoing
immunisation efforts against SARS-CoV-2. Crucially, efforts to
accelerate R&D must be complemented by other policies that can
shorten the timeline between pathogen identification and
population coverage, such as regulatory innovation to facilitate
platform-based vaccine licensure, development of multivalent or
universal vaccines, and efforts to ensure global, equitable vaccine
access53. Additionally, to prepare for scenarios where conventional
clinical trials may be unethical or infeasible, there is a need for
regulatory innovation to facilitate potential emergency use
authorisation on the basis of efficacy data from animal models
J.T. Monrad et al.
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and in some cases controlled human infection models17,54,55.
Finally, realising the full potential of platform vaccines requires
overcoming challenges in manufacturing and delivery, such as
improving nucleic acid vaccine thermostability or creating cold
chain storage solutions and developing devices for DNA vaccine
electroporation. As the enormous human and economic costs of
the COVID-19 pandemic make painfully clear, investments that
enable more rapid development of medical countermeasures can
provide potential net economic benefits on the order of trillions of
dollars13, paying for themselves many times over and enhancing
global health security in the process.
Received: 2 November 2020; Accepted: 4 January 2021;
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